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Practice Court Work
BY CHARLES M. HEPBURN
Dean, Indiana University School of Law

F

OR
the Indiana
a syshas hadUniverof Law
sity many
Schoolyears
tem of Practice Courts as an integral
part of its curriculum. The system consists of a court for the second semester
of the first year, of another court for
both semesters of the second year, and
of a third court for both semesters of
the graduating year. Each court is under the immediate direction of a member of the Law Faculty, who selects the
cases to be tried, criticizes the pleadings,
and supervises the trials. Every case is
tried before a bench of two or three "associate justices," selected by the professor in charge from the student members
of the court, and appointed for the particular case. At an adjourned session,
after the argument of the case by attorneys selected for the plaintiff and the defendant, each associate justice reads and
files a seriatim opinion, which also comes
under the criticism of the "chief justice."
The work of the students in these
courts, if successfully completed and
certified to by the professor in charge,
carries credit which is counted on the
seventy-two hours of subject credit requited for the LL.B degree. One semester hour of credit is possible in the
first year Moot Court, two are possible
in the second year, and four in the third
year. The result is that the student can
acquire through this Moot Court work
about one-tenth of the entire subject
credit necessary for his first degree in
law. This subject credit, aggregating
seven semester hours, is in addition to
twelve hours of subject credit which
may be obtained by the successful completion of classroom procedural study in
Common-Law Pleading, Code Pleading,
and Evidence. Of these nineteen hours,
five are required for graduation, four of
them in Common-Law Pleading, and one
in the first year Moot Court.

This system raises various questions.
The importance of the inductive study
of the principles of Common-Law Pleading, Code Pleading, and Evidence may
be granted; but why should a law student spend about one-tenth of his time
in Practice Court work? The principles of Anglo-American substantive law
are crowding the three-year curriculum
to its limits. Every year the pressure
becomes greater. In justice to our students, should we give so much time to
the Practice Courts? Why not leave
this kind of work to voluntary clubs,
formed by the students themselves, and
conducted without graduation credit?
Apart from this, if a law school offers
so much credit for Practice Court work,
does it not encourage in its students a
rule of thumb habit of thought, instead
of the habit of a reasoned judgment
from legal principles?
The answer to each of these questions
is, in general, that it depends upon the
way the Practice Court work is organized and conducted. There is danger of
waste of time and effort in faculty conducted Moot Courts, as in student clubs
for practice work in procedure, even
when the student clubs really function.
There is, no doubt, a special danger of
rule of thumb work in the Practice
Courts. But Practice Courts can, I
think, be so organized and conducted
that the student's reasoning power will
be stimulated and strengthened, quite as
effectively as in the best courses in substantive law. With no very burdensome
co-operation on the part of the law faculty, the work of the Practice Courts, it
would seem, can be brought into such
relation to the student substantive law
courses as to give a keen and lasting
edge to many of their important distinctions.
But there is another question deserving of attention here-two closely relat-
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ed questions.

Every law school worthy

of the name owes a duty to its graduates
individually. Every law school owes a
duty to the profession. Has the school
discharged its duty to its graduates if it
turns them out so poorly equipped for
the practical work of the courts that,
like blind leaders of the blind, they and
their clients will almost certainly fall into the ditch? However it may be in the
millenium, the trial of a case is still, in
ome measure, a contest of technical
skill between adverse parties. Now and
then the law graduate can obtain this
training in a law office; but these
chances are rather limited and apparentlv are growing less. A great law teacher has suggested that the young law
graduate, when in doubt as to the proper procedure, should consult the clerk of
the court; but this seems hardly advisable outside of Utopia.
We live in a law school age. Bacon's
axiom has a wider range than it had
three hundred years ago; we of to-day
can well hold, not only every lawyer,but every law school, a debtor to the
profession. One chief item in this debt
is that of the duty to promote the efficient administration of justice. Do the
law schools meet this duty adequately
when they graduate students so poorly
prepared for actual participation in the
adininistration of justice that they cannot prepare or conduct a case properly,
either in the trial court or on appeal?
"We find no greater problem here," remarked Judge Drury, of the Kentucky
Court of Appeals, last February, "than
the proper disposition of cases that have
not been properly practiced in the trial
courts and are poorly presented here." '
Through the delay which it causes, if
in no other respects, this lack of training
tends to the defeat of justice. Because
of it, many of our American courtrooms
might fittingly have above their portals
the historic name, "The Hall of Wasted
H ours." Possibly this maxim, recently
quoted with approval by Mr. Justice
McReynolds, might be inscribed above
the judges' bench, in plain view of the
barristers: "There is no debt with so
I Axton

v. Vance (1925, Ky.) 269 S. W 534, 538.

much prejudice put off as that of jus-

tice."

2

The inefficient administration of justice in American courts presents one of
our greatest problems. Forward looking
lawyers, with here and there an association of lawyers, have been preaching the
importance of a reform movement. In
July, 1913, the American Judicature Society was granted a charter by the state
of Illinois for the one great purpose of
promoting the efficient administration of
justice. To that end, the Judicattire Society has been seeking, through almost
twelve years, "to co-ordinate the efforts
of bar associations and individual lawyers throughout the country." '
But this debt of justice is owing from
the law schools no legs than from the
active bench and bar. Perhaps the moral obligation resting on the law schools
is even greater. Certainly they could be
of very great assistance in the cause, if
they would undertake it in its length and
breadth, and on a broad scientific and
constructive plan.
The reform will not come from men
with will-o'-the-wisp minds advocating
a vague, doctrinaire idealism in procedure. Neither can it be expected from
law school graduates who enter the active profession with only a smattering
of our procedural law as applied in t6e
courts. It is easy for such a graduate
to slip into the well-worn grooves. Because of his lack of scientific training in
this field of the law, he often becomes
the easy and helpless victim of the local
form book. But may we not hope eventually to see a reform in theory and in
fact, when the law schools have equipped
the profession with a large body of graduates who have acquired in their law
school course a scientific knowledge of
our existing procedure as applied in the
courts, of its ineffectiveness in the actual
work of the courts, of the causes of this
ineffectiveness, and of the practical nature of the remedies proposed.
Whether training of this character and
2 in Swiss National Insurance Company v. Miller (1925, U. S.)45 Sup. Ct. 213, 224.
3 See the article by Mr. Herbert Harley in 62 PennFyvvania Law Review, No. 5, p. 340 (1914).
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scope can be accomplished in the threeyear curriculum is doubtful. We need
a fourth year, which, in the State University Sch6ols, it would seem, might
well be organized as a research and legal clinic year, with a reasonably complete training for the efficient administration of justice as its chief objective.
A good deal in this line, however, can
be accomplished in the three-year curriculum, even on a ten per cent. of subject credit, And perhaps some further
details as to the work in the Indiana
University School of Law may be of
service here.
When the first-year student begins his
Moot Court work, at the opening of his
second semester, he has spent about
twenty-five classroom hours on the
course of the action at law, from its
commencement until it reaches a court
of error. With this he has been given,
rather briefly, the corresponding features of the civil action of the Codes, and
their statutory references. He has also
had a good deal to do with the examination and discussion of common-law
pleadings and distinctions, and their relation to the facts of a given controversy. In his Mfoot Court work he is
trained in the drafting and testing, in
arguments before the court, of pleadings
under the fundamental principles and
with special reference to given states of
facts.
A good deal of time is spent in the
actual framing and testing of the plaintiff's first pleading, as based on facts
furnished by the professor in charge,
and on the proper way to meet this first
pleading, Whatever method he adopts
is to be tested out by him in proper
form, under the criticism of the professor in charge. For the sake of the contrast he is required in some cases to
plead out a civil cause, and then a criminal cause, both arising out of the same
set of facts. The outcome here is carefully scrutinized by the instructor, and
may be submitted by him to argument
before a bench of three first-year students, whose seriatim opinions come under his criticism before the members of
the court.
The work in Moot Court II, which
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runs through the second year, is conducted as nearly as may be on the line
of actual cases in courts of first instance.
Through the courtesy of the county
commissioners, this court is held once a
week, from seven till ten in the evening,
in the well-equipped courtroom of the
local circuit court. Through a rare piece
of good fortune, the judge of the circuit
court, an enthusiast in the cause, sits as
chief justice, with associate justices
from the members of the court. Some
time in advance of the trial a mimeographed statement of the facts of some
actual case as they may have come at
the outset to the plaintiff's lawyer is given to every student member of the court.
At this stage the actual case is carefully kept under cover. Its facts are
given in gross, material and immaterial,
substantive and evidential, actual and
fanciful. The ideal in this preliminary
statement would match what Charles
O'Conor once wrote the South Carolina lawyers was the common practice in
New York in his day-"to tell your
story as any old woman, in trouble for
the first time, would narrate her grievances." With this mass of facts and
fancies, every student is required, as
plaintiff's attorney, to institute the suit
in the proper form, with its appropriate
pleading, and in strictest accord with the
rules which govern in an actual court of
first instance.
One feature in connection with this
second year Moot Court work is the
Clerk's Office Seminar. Fortunately,
again, we have a former student of the
law school as deputy clerk in the local
court. He conducts the students, in
small groups, through the clerk's office,
and brings them into touch with everything in the progress of a case in his
charge until the trial docket is framed.
In the third year Moot Court" which
runs through the year, the work is based
on actual cases in progress from a court
of first instance to the Supreme Court.
Lawyers who have been engaged in the
actual cases come down, generally from
Indianapolis, to supervise, as chief justices, the work of the court, with special
reference to its preparation for an appeal, including the writing of briefs. In
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the latter half of the third year, a judge
of the Supreme Court comes down to
sit as chief justice in the argument of
these cases before the Appellate Division of the Practice Court.
Here again student members of the
court sit as associate justices, and read
and file written seriatim opinions, for
whatever objections the judge of the Supreme Court chooses to make, and for
his advice. At the close of the case the
results which had been reached in the
actual case, whether in the trial court or
on appeal, are used to point a moral at
any stage of the progress of the case in
the Practice Court.
One difficulty in connection with this
work is the lack as yet of a vade mecum
book for the Moot Court students, in all

these classes. Some books on trial practice approach .it, but none as yet appear
to meet it successfully. We need a book
which will enable the Moot 'Court students to get, in a compact, simple, and
analytical form, the course of proceedings in the fundamental things of a civil
action, with precedents of how to plead
and how not to plead.
It is rather surprising what an interesting collection of precedents of how
not to plead are furnished in recent cases
in the reports, as even a casual card index reveals. Perhaps this collection of
cards, on precedents of how not to plead,
furnishes an additional reason why the
law schools should lend a hand in promoting the efficient administration of
justice.

Classes in Court Practice and Procedure
By DUDLEY G. WOOTEN, A.M., LL. D.
College of Law, University of Notre Dano
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article upon the subject of the course in
court work in law schools, or what is
commonly called Moot Court practice.
In recent years the law magazines and
interested organizations have published
a voluminous literature discussing the
modern methods of legal education,
most of which has had for its theme the
superiority of the new over the old plan
of preparing men for the bar, advocating apparently the exclusive monopoly
of such preparation by the law school,
and the total abolition of the former
method of apprenticeship in a law office,
preliminary to a course of systematic
study in the classroom under professional teachers.
If it were relevant to the purpose of
this article, a good deal might be said
in moderation of the extravagant claims
of the protagonists of the law school
method as the sole agency for making
lawyers. The only reason for the law

school at all is as a means to an end,
namely, to fit students to become capable, successful, and eminent practitioners
and jurists, qualified for the highest
rank at the bar and on the bench, and it
remains to be satisfactorily shown that
the bench and bar of to-day, which are
mainly the product of modern law
schools, are distinguished for ability,
skill, resourcefulness, eloquence, and
fidelity to the responsibilities of the legal profession above a like number of
practitioners and judges of fifty to seventy-five years ago, who came to the
bar by the methods of preparation then
in vogue.
There are more lawyers, even in proportion to population, than formerly, and
there is a wider diffusion of theoretical
information on legal subjects, a greater
fluency in the exploitation of the academic and philosophical aspects of the
law as a social agency, a keen and not
always discreet concern for reforms and
new classifications, and a modernistic

